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We define and analyse a new class of perfect information games. The nodes of a 
directed graph G are partitioned into n player sets. Starting at a fixed node of G an 
infinite path is created as follows: If  the current node belongs to player k, then 
player k chooses any successor node. A local reward n-vector is assigned to every 
arc. The payoff corresponding to the infinite path is the long term average of the 
local reward vectors. Such games are called DGA games. Negative and positive 
results are obtained for the existence of Nash equilibria in certain types of pure 
strategies (e.g., stationary and automated strategies). Applications to duopoly 
pricing models and “surveillance games” on graphs are given. I(” 1991 Academx 
Press. Inc 
In the traditional theory of games the possibility of a position reoccur- 
ring is excluded by modelling extensive forms as trees-directed graphs 
without cycles. Presumably the reason for the exclusion of cycles is to 
ensure that infinite play is impossible and that eventually a terminal node 
is reached. However, there are many examples of conflict situations in 
which positions may reoccur. It seems advisable to enlarge the notion of an 
extensive form game to cover these. This paper explores some of the mathe- 
matical consequences of allowing cycles in games of perfect information. 
We are particularly interested in determining situations in which the 
Zermelo-Kuhn Theorem, on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria, 
holds for perfect information games with cycles. As we shall see, the answer 
depends on the nature of the pure strategies allowed. Before describing our 
games more formally, we briefly mention two senses in which cycles are 
already covered by game theory. It is certainly true that any game with 
cycles is equivalent to a tree whose nodes are paths of the original game. 
However, this tree will be infinite and no useful general results for such 
trees are known. Also it should be said that in the zero-sum case our games 
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are special cases of “recursive” games [E] or “stochastic games” [BK], 
where positions can also reoccur. But those theories are not very useful for 
the construction of pure strategy equilibria. 
The games considered in this paper will all have the following Deter- 
ministic Graph (DG) dynamics: There is a given finite directed graph G, 
together with an assignment of one of the n players to each of the nonter- 
minal nodes. The play begins at a designated starting node and the player 
assigned to the current node picks the next node from among its successors 
in the graph. For the moment, we will say that the game stops if a terminal 
node (i.e., one with no successors) is reached. This dynamic structure was 
considered by Berge [Bl, B2], but with different payoffs than considered 
here. 
Before discussing payoffs, it will be convenient to first define strategies. 
A pure strategy for player k is any rule that assigns to any path in G which 
ends at a player k node, one of its successor nodes. A stationary strategy 
is a pure strategy which depends only on the final node of the path. In 
other words, it always chooses the same successor whenever that node is 
reached. An m-automatic strategy is one which can be played by an 
automaton with m internal states where inputs and outputs are coded to 
the nodes of G. As the play proceeds the current node is input into the 
automaton and, if it belongs to the player using this automaton, the output 
node is played. (A l-automatic strategy is simply a stationary strategy.) 
We now discuss payoffs. Washburn [Wl] considers DG games with ter- 
minal payoff, which we will call DGT games. In these games (he considers 
only the two person zero sum case) a payoff is assigned to every terminal 
node. If the play terminates at such a node, player 1 gets the payoff 
assigned to that node. If the play is nonterminating, the payoff is zero. The 
existence of stationary optimal strategies (and a value) for DGT games 
follows from the general theory of recursive games [R]. However, 
Washburn is able to construct optimal stationary strategies by a finite 
recursive procedure which is polynomial in the number of nodes. 
In this paper we will consider a more general payoff structure where the 
players may have preferences over different nonterminating plays. We 
technically modify the dynamics so that a terminal node is replaced by a 
loop (arc from the node to itself). Hence all plays of the game are non- 
terminating, while plays which were originally (i.e., with terminal nodes) 
terminating are now eventually constant. A local reward vector is assigned 
to every arc. The kth coordinate of this vector is interpreted as the 
payment to player k made whenever the play traverses this arc. The total 
payoff vector vector is the long term (Cesaro) average of the local reward 
vectors of the traversed arcs. Such games will be called Deterministic 
Graph Games with Time-Average Payoffs, or DGA games. Every DGT 
game can be made into a DGA game by assigning the terminal payoff to 
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the associated terminal loops and assigning 0 vector payoffs to all other 
arcs. Plays ending at a terminal node (loop) will have an average reward 
tending to the vector attached to the terminal loop. Other plays will have 
all their average payoffs zero. Hence DGA games subsume DGT games, as 
well as perfect information game trees. 
There are four main results on the existence of Nash equilibria in various 
types of pure strategies for DGA games. 
1. In DGA games, a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies may 
not exist. A three person non-zero sum example is given in Section 2. 
2. Every DGA game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This 
result (Theorem 2) is proved in Sections 3-5. 
3. The previous two results say that there are equilibrium strategy 
profiles, but they are not too simple. The third result (Theorem 3) says that 
there are always m-automated equilibrium strategies, where m is the 
factorial of the number of nodes. 
4. As noted above, zero-sum DGA games can be thought of as very 
special cases of stochastic games with time-average payoff. For such games 
the existence of stationary optimal strategies was asserted in [G], proved 
rigorously in [LL], and can now be seen as a special case of the conditions 
in [BK). A constructive non-probabilistic algorithm for optimal strategies 
is given in [EM]. 
In addition to these general results, we give applications of DGA games 
to duopoly pricing (Section 7) and “recapture” and “surveillance” games on 
graphs (Section 8). In Section 9 we briefly discuss possible extensions to 
imperfect information games with cycles, and their relation to the problem 
of “repeated decisions” solved by Isbell [Is]. 
1. DGA GAMES 
In this section we give a formal definition of a DGA game and of an 
equilibrium strategy profile. Let G be a finite directed graph with arcs A 
and nodes N partitioned into “player sets” Nk, k = 1, . . . . n, where n is the 
number of players. To ensure that the play of the game can always proceed 
we assume that the successor map Sue: N + 2” is never empty, where 
Sue(i) = {j: (i, j) E A }. We assume that there is a distinguished node caled 
1 in N. A “local reward” function 3.: A -+ IR” is given, where J,(a) is inter- 
preted as the utility payoff to player’k made whenever arc a is traversed. 
The data G, N, N,, and 1. completely define DGA games, as described 
below. 
A sequence of nodes x = (x,, xl, . ..) with x0 = 1 and x,, I E Suc(x,) will 
be called a “history” if infinite and a “path” if finite. The sets of all histories 
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and paths will respectively be denoted by H and P. If p = (pO,..., p,) is a 
path, it has an ending node e(p) = pm and a length Z(p) = m which counts 
the number of its arcs. If t is a non-negative integer and x is a history or 
a path of length at least t define x’= (x,, x1,..., x,) to be the initial path of 
x of length t. Define Pk = { p E P: e(p) E Nk} to be the player partition of 
the set of paths. 
A strategy ok for player k is a map (TV: P, + N satisfying crk( p) E 
Suc(e( p)). The set of strategies available to player k is denoted Sk. 
A strategy profile is a n-tuple o = ((r,, . . . . c,,) with crk E S,. A strategy profile 
o determines a unique history h = co(~) by the recursive definition h, = 1 
and h , + 1 = a,(h’) if h’ E P,. In order words, if the play so far is (ho,..., h,) 
and the current node h, belongs to player k, then player k chooses the next 
node h,, i among the successor nodes of h, be a method which may depend 
on the entire past history (h,, . . . . h,_i, h,). The map co: S, x ... x S, -+ H 
completely describes the dynamics of a DGA game. 
To describe the payoff structure of a DGA game we first extend the local 
reward vector A, originally defined on arcs, to all path p by the obvious 
definition I(p) = cf’_“‘, A( P,~ i, p,). It is also useful to have an “average 
reward vector” I* defined on paths p by 2*(p) = n(p)//(p). For any 
strategy profile cr, let h = co(~) and define 
and 
n(a)= lim n*(ht), U(o)= glJl A*(h’), 
r-m t-m 
(if it exits) ZZ(a) = lim 1*(/r’) 
r--r02 
The solution concept we will use for DGA games is an “equilibrium 
strategy profile” by which we mean a profile 6 satisfying, for all k and all 
CkESk, 4s~,, . . . . 6k-l, Ok, ck+l, . . . . r-7,) < n,(5). Note in particular that 
limiting average payoffs exist for all players at an equilibrium, and that it 
is a Nash equilibrium as long as player k’s utility lies between n, and n, 
for all k. 
In Section 5 we will complete the description of a finite algorithm for 
constructing an equilibrium strategy profile for any DGA game. Part of 
this algorithm uses the Zermelo-Kuhn backwards recursion applied to a 
finite perfect information game F which we define in Section 3. The other 
part of the algorithm involves a simple procedure for “decycling” a path, 
which we describe in Section 4. 
2. NONEXISTENCE OF STATIONARY EQUILIBRIA 
In this section we give an example of a DGA game with no equilibrium 
strategy profile in stationary strategies. Let G be the complete directed 
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graph on three nodes 1,2,3 partitioned in the natural way (k E Nk) among 
threeplayers.Labelthesixarcsasa=(l,2),h=(l,3),r=(2,1),s=(2,3), 
u = (3,2), v = (3, 1); and the five cycles as C, = at-, C, = hv, C, = us, 
C, = asv, and C, = hur. Define the local reward vector as 
A(a)= (O,O, 3) j.(b) = (2, 0, 0) A(r) = (0, 0, 3) 
l(s) = 6,0, - 3) A(u) = (0, 6, 0) it(v) = (0, - 3, 0) 
2 
extensive form 
b 
u: level 1 normal form v: level 2 
I=\ :p$q 
FIG. 1. A DGA game and the normal form for stationary strategies. No stationary 
equilibrium. 
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so that 
n*(c,) = (0, 0, 3) n*(c,) = (1, - $, 0) l*(C,)(3, 3, - $1 
n*(c,) = (2, - 130)) /l*(c,)= (f, 2, 1). 
All this information is depicted in Fig. 1, together with the normal form 
in stationary strategies (i.e., dependent on current node only, not prior 
history). Observe that if all players use stationary strategies then the 
history of the game eventually consists of repetitions of a cycle C and 
IE* = J*(C). Note that each of the eight boxes, corresponding to a possible 
Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies, has a code indicating a player 
who would unilaterally deviate. For example the + in box, a, r, u indicates 
that player 2 prefers C,(a, s, U) to C1(a, r, u). This is checked by observing 
that &(C,) = 3 > &(C,) = 0. The code “up” indicates a preference of u over 
u by player 3. 
3. THE “FIRST CYCLE" GAME F 
In this section we define a finite, n-person, perfect information game F, 
based on the same data as the DGA games (which is nor a finite game) of 
the previous section. The game F is played as before except that it stops as 
soon as a node is repeated. Each player k then receives the payoff n,*(C), 
where C is the first cycle to appear. 
More formally, we define the extensive form (game tree) of F as follows. 
Let D c P be the set of all node-distinct paths and let D, = D n P,. Let 
Tc P denote the set of all paths x= (1 =x0, x,, . . . . x,, ,,., x,) with 
xmP ’ ED and x, =x, where m = l(x) and r < m. The paths p E T are the 
terminal nodes of the game tree of F, and the paths in D are the non- 
terminal nodes. The payoff vector f(x) assigned to an XE T is given by 
i*(x,, . ..) x,), the average local reward of the arcs of the first cycle 
FC(x) = (x,, x, + 1, . . . . x,) of x. Observe that the first cycle function FC(x) 
is well defined for any x in m D u H (any history, or any path with a cycle), 
since every history contains a cycle. 
A strategy for player k in F is a map sk: D, -+ N with s,Jp) a successor 
node of e(p) E N,. A strategy profile s = (sl, . . . . s,) in F determines a unique 
terminal “node” p = y(s) E T in the same way as described in the last sec- 
tion, since the graph G is finite and a node must eventually repeat. Using 
the same notation f for payoff, define the payoff of a profile s by f(s) = 
f(y(s)). In other words the payoff vector of a profile is the average reward 
of the arcs of the first cycle it produces. It is important to note that the 
initial part of the game path not in the cycle is not relevant to the payoff. 
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Since F is a finite perfect information game, the Zermelo-Kuhn proce- 
dure (see Owen [0, Sect. 1.41) gives a perfect equilibrium strategy profile 
for F, which we will call s^. Let 6 = y(.?) E T be the terminal node corre- 
sponding to the equilibrium strategy profile S and let c = FC( jj) be called 
the “equilibrium cycle.” More generally, for any strategy profile s, let 
C(s) = FC(y(s)) be the “terminal cycle” corresponding to s. Thus c = C(.?) 
and the payoff is f(s) = ,?*(C(s)). In this notation, the equilibrium concept 
is described as follows: 
THEOREM I. There is a ,finite recursive’ procedure yielding a strategy> 
profile J: ,fOr the “jirst cycle” game F, with the ,fbllowing property. Let  ^
C= FC(y(s^)). For any k and strategy sk of player k, let C(s,)= 
FC(y(3, , . . . . d, ~ , , sk, ik + 1 , . . . . .?,)). Then l.:( C(s,)) d Q(c). 
This simply says that if any player k uniquely deviates from his equi- 
librium strategy, then the resulting terminal cycle is not better for him than 
the equilibrium cycle c. 
The game tree of the first cycle game F corresponding to the complete 
graph game of Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 2. The recursive algorithm for deter- 
C3 c4 c5 c3 
1232 1231 1321 1323 
FIG. 2. The game tree F for the DGA game of Fig. 1, and its recursive equilibrium .i. 
c= c,. 
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mining s^ is also indicated on the same figure. Initially outcomes (cycles C;) 
are known only for the six terminal nodes. To determine the cycle at node 
123, for example, player 3 must choose between C, (at node 1232) or C4 
(at node 1231). Since n:(C,) = 0 > - 3/2 = l*(C,), we have written C4 at 
node 123, and drawn a “strategy arrow” on the arc u from 123 to 1231. 
Eventually this finite process ends when C, is written at the starting 
node 1, at which point we learn that C, = C is the equilibrium cycle. The 
strategy arrows determine the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy 
profile s^. 
4. THE DECYCLING OPERATOR d: P + D 
In this section we define an operator d which successively removes cycles 
from a path x E P until a node disjoint path d(x) ED is obtained. This 
operator will provide the link between an infinite DGA game G and an 
associated “first cycle” game F. 
Recall from the last section the first cycle operation FC which assigns to 
any XE -D u H its first cycle FC(x). For such an x we define M(X) to 
be what remains after the first cycle of x is removed. That is, if 
x = (x,, x,, . . . . x,, . . . . x,, . ..) where x, is the first repeated node, and 
x,=x, with r-cm, then CI(X)=(X,,,X ,,..., x,, xm+,, x,,,+* ,...) and 
FC(x) = (x,, . . . . x,). 
For any path XE -D there is a least integer q = #(x), called the cycle 
number of x, such that g9(x) E D (has no more cycles). For x E -D define 
d(x)=a#‘“‘(x) and f or x E D define d(x) = x. This defines d for all x E P 
and we call d(x) the decycled x. Observe that d: P + D and d is the identity 
on D. For XE -D and j= 1, . . . . #(x) define cycles C,(x) inductively by 
C,(x) = FC(& l(x)). For example, if x = (1,2, 3,4, 3, 2,4, 5) then 
#(x) = 2, C,(x) = (3,4, 3), C,(x) = (2, 3,2), and the decycled x is d(x) = 
(1, 2, 4, 5). For histories h E H we can define an infinite sequence of cycles 
C,(h), j= 1, 2, . . . . by C,(h) = FC(a’-‘(h)). 
Observe that since any arc of a path XE -D is either in a(x) or in 
FC(x), but not both, it is clear that we have the identity L(x) = ;~(cL(x)) + 
I(FC(x)). Applying this formula successively to the paths U’(X), 
j= 1, . . . . #(x) - 1, we obtain the useful expansion 
T+(x) 
‘(XI = ‘(4x1) + C A(Cj(X)), 
j=l 
and 
I(d(x)) #x l(C-(x)) 
n*(x) = z(x) --+c A. n*(c,(x)). i-1 ‘tx) 
(4.2 
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Similar but simpler reasoning gives us 
l(x) = l(d(x)) + y l(C,(x)). 
/=l 
(4.3 1 
5. EXISTENCE AND CONSTRUCTION OF EQUILIBRIUM PROFILES 
We now show how the constructions of the last two sections may 
be combined to construct equilibrium profiles for DGA games. Let 
.f= (s^l, . ..) s^,) be the equilibrium strategy for the “first cycle” game F, and 
let d: P + D be the decycling operator. Define a strategy profile 6 for the 
DGA game by the equation 
B,(P) = s^k(d(P)), k=l , . . . . n. 
Observe that this is well defined because the operator d is end- 
preserving, e(d( p)) = e(p), and hence maps P, into D,. The calculation 
of ok involves two finite procedures: constructing the strategies .?, and 
computing d(p), given p. The following two lemmas establish that 6 is an 
equilibrium strategy profile, which will prove Theorem 2. Actually 
Lemma 2 proves that 6 has equilibrium properties stronger than asserted in 
Theorem 2. 
DEFINITION. Let W be any subset of the player set ( 1, . . . . n> and let s,, 
i E W, be strategies for player i in the game F. A path p E D u T (i.e., a node 
of the game tree of F) is said to be consistent with {s;} ie w  if for all t < 1(p) 
with pr E N, for some i E W, we have p, + , = si( p’). 
LEMMA 1. Let W be a subset of the players. Let o = (a,, . . . . o,,) be a 
strategy profile .for the DGA game for which oi = 6, ,for all iE W. (Recall 
that 6,(p)=Si(d(p).) Let h= a(a) be the history corresponding to o. For 
t = 0, 1, . . . define y(t) = (d(h’), h,, ,). Then,for all t 3 0, y(t) ED u T (a node 
of F) and y(t) is consistent with the strategies W* = {ii} ic ,+,. 
Proof. To see that y(t) ED u T recall that the range of d is D so that 
d(h’) E D. Since e(h’) = e(d(h’)) = h, and h,, , E Suc(h,) it follows that 
y(t) E P. Hence y(t) is either in T or D depending respectively on whether 
or not the node h,,, appears in the path d(h’). 
To prove that for t 2 0, y(t) is consistent with W*, we use induction on 
t. Observe that y(0) = (h,, h,). If h,= 1 E Pi for some iE W, then 
h, = ai( bi(hO)=s^Jh,), so y(0) is consistent with W*. Now assume 
that y(m) is consistent with W*. We consider separately the cases y(m) E D 
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and y(m) E T. If y(m) ED then d(h”+‘) = (d(P), h,, ,), and so ~(m + 1) = 
(y(m), h,+2)=(4h”), h,+l,h,+2). If h,+l~P,, iew, then hm+*= 
s^,(y(m)). So since y(m) is consistent with W*, by assumption, then so is 
~(m + 1). If ye T, then letting b=l(y(m)), we have y(m),= ye = 
h WZ+1 for a unique r< 6. In this case d(h”+‘)= (y(m),, . . . . y(m)‘, and 
Y@ + 1) = (y(m)‘, h m + 2). Since y(m) is consistent with W*, so is the initial 
subpath am. If h,, 1 E Pi for some i in W then hm+2 = s^,(y(m)‘), so we 
also have that ~(m + 1) is consistent with W*. 
LEMMA 2. Let h = 00(b) be the history of the DGA game if every player 
iadopts &(p)=s^,(d(p)) andlet h(~k)=C0(~1,...,8k~I,~.k,Bk+l,...,6n) be 
the history tf all but player k play as above and player k plays ok. Then for 
every j= 1, 2, . . . . Cj(h) = C’, where C is the equilibrium cycle of F, and 
l,*(Cj(h(a/c))) B AZ(e). 
Proof For any history h, let t, < t, < . . . < tj < be the t’s such that 
y(t) = (d(h’), h,, i) E T. Observe that for all j, CJh) = FC( y(tj)). Take h = h 
and apply Lemma 1 with W= { 1, . . . . n}, the ful set of players. Hence the 
paths y(t,) are terminal nodes of F “which are consistent with, iSi} 
i = 1, . ..) n. Hence y(t,) = y(i) and so Cj(h) = FC( y(t,)) = FC(y(s^)) = C. 
Next, take h= h(a,) and W= { 1, . . . . n} - {k}. It follows from Lemma 1 
that y(tj) are terminal nodes of F consistent with {s^i}izk. Hence by 
Theorem 1, A,*(C,(h(o,))) = ,?.z(FC(y(tj))) d n,*(C). 
THEOREM 2. The recursively constructed profile 6, given by ei(p) = 
s^,(d(p)), is an equilibrium strategy profile for the DGA game. 
Proof Take x = /i’ in (4.2), where /? = co(&), and noting that C,(x) = C 
we obtain 
Since 2 is bounded on the finite set D (sd(h’)) the first term goes to zero 
as t + co. For the same reason, together with (4.3), the coefficient of n*(C) 
in (5.1) goes to 1. Hence 
n(6) = lim n*(P) = n*(C). (5.2) r-02 
Applying the same reasoning (and (4.2)) to x = (h(ok))‘, subtracting (5.1), 
and using the second part of Lemma 2, yields 
Q(h(ok)‘) - &!@) d 44h(o,)‘)) -W(h) 
t (5.3) 
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Since the right side of (5.3) goes to zero, 
I&(6,, . . . . ~k-1,~k,~k+,,dN)~limi,*(h(o,)‘)B17,(6)=~,*(C). (5.4) 
Together, (5.2) and (5.4) establish the theorem. 
If there are two players (n=2) and the local reward vector 1. has coor- 
dinates summing to zero, then we may interpret n,(a) as the amount 
player 2 pays to player 1 when a is traversed. We then define a “zero-sum 
DGA game” by taking 1 as maximizer and payoff fi, . (Alternatively we 
could have taken the lim inf evaluation &‘, as payoff.) It follows 
immediately from the previous theorem that this game has a minimax in 
pure strategies (as noted in the Introduction, the existence of stationary 
minimax strategies follows from known results). 
COROLLARY 1. If l1 + & is identically zero on A then there exist 
strategies 6, E S, and CT* E S, such that 
n,tfl,, 02)Gnn,(a,, ~*)dm, ad ,forall o,ES,, and o,ES,. 
Proof: Let (5 = (a,, cYz) be any equilibrium profile, as guaranteed by 
Theorem 2. The first inequality is the definition of equilibrium, with k = 1. 
The hypothesis on 2 gives n, = -17, and 17, = -Z7, (if the limits exist). 
Hence, taking k = 2 in the definition of equilibrium gives 
6. EXISTENCE OF AUTOMATED STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA 
The results of Sections 2 and 5 show that while there are always DGA 
equilibria using strategies depending on the entire past history, there may 
well be no equilibrium in very simple, say stationary, strategies. In this 
section we demonstrate that there are always equilibrium profiles 
employing strategies implementable by finite state automata. Such 
strategies have recently been the focus of much attention in game theory, 
particularly for repeated games. (See [RI.) 
We define an m-automated strategy for player k in a DGA game as a 
3-tuple (Z,, c(~, flk) where Zk is a set (of internal states) with no more than 
m elements, all: Zk x N--f Z, and Pk: Zk x N -+ N are maps. If zO E Z, is the 
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initial internal state, and x is a history of the game consistent with this 
strategy then we define z, = a(~,_ ,, x,) for t = 1,2,... and require that 
b(z, _ r, x,) E Suc(x,) whenever e(x’) E Nk. 
The interpretation of the above definition is straightforward. As the 
game proceeds the new node x, is input into player k’s automaton, which 
then changes its internal state accordingly. If x, is not a player k node, the 
automaton’s output node w,+ r = /?,Jz,~, , x,) is ignored. However, if 
x, E N, then the referee takes the output w,+ r =x,-r as the next node. 
As an example, a stationary strategy is a l-automated strategy, with 
Z, = {zO}, elk the constant zO, and bk(zO, i) is the unique response to the 
node i. Thus the example in Section 2 demonstrates that, in general, there 
need not be an equilibrium in l-automated strategies. However, we will 
prove the following: 
THEOREM 3. In any DGA game with node set N there is an equilibrium 
strategy profile in (#N- l)!-automated strategies (Z,, dk, flk), k = 1, . . . . n. 
Proof. We will show that the strategies B,(p) = 3,(d(p)), k = 1, . . . . n, 
can in fact be implemented by automated strategies. Since the bk form an 
equilibrium profile (Theorem 2), this will prove the theorem. 
The recursive computation of the bk is a simple consequence of the 
identity 
d(2) = d(d(x’- ‘), x,) for XE P, l(x)> t. (6.1) 
Let Zk = D, with zO= 1 (the initial node) and observe that 
# (D) $ ( #N - 1 )! with equality only for the complete graph. For x E D 
and iE Suc(e(p)) define cc,(p, i) = d(p, i) and /?,Jp, i) = s,(d(p, i)). If 
i# Suc(e( p)) then c(,J p, i) and /?J p, i) may be defined arbitrarily. Let 
zO= 1 =x0 and defined x1, zr, x2, z2, . . . recursively as follows. If x, E Nj, 
j# k, then player j chooses x,+ r = ai where aje S,. If X,E Nk then 
X f+, = bk(z,, x,). Similarly z,, I = clk(z,, x,+ r). It follows inductively from 
these definitions and (6.1) that zl=d(x’) for all t. Consequently when 
x, E Nk we have that x,+ r = flk(z,- 1, x,) = s^,(d(d(x’- ‘)), x’) = ;/Jd(x’)) = 
bk(xf). Hence (Z,, ak, /Ik) implements dk, as required, and the theorem is 
proved. 
7. AN APPLICATION TO DUOPOLY PRICING 
We now give an example of a simple economic problem which may be 
viewed as a DGA game on a complete bipartite graph. Consider a duopoly 
model where two firms I and II alternately set prices which they cannot 
then change for two time periods. In any period when I’s price is indexed 
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by i (chosen from the finite set { 1, . . . . m}) and II’s price is Jo (1, . . . . n} the 
respective profits for I and II are A(i, j) and B( i, j), where A and B are 
known m x n matrices. The game begins in period 1 where II chooses his 
price j, knowing I’s externally fixed initial prices 1 = i,. In succeeding 
periods they alternately choose prices i,, jZ, i,, . . . . i,, j,, . . . with knowledge 
of all preceding prices. The average profit for II for the price sequence up 
to j,, i, + , is given by 
with a similar formula with A replacing B for I’s average profit. We assume 
that each player wishes to maximize his long term average profit. Similar 
models have appeared in the economics literature for players maximizing 
the discounted sum of their single period profits. (See [MT, W2].) 
The above problem may be modeled as a DGA game on a complete 
bipartite graph G whose nodes are partitioned into two sets N, = 
{a 1, ..., a,} and N,, = {b, , . . . . 6,) and with arcs 
A = {(a,, bi), (bi, aj): i= 1, . . . . m; j= 1, . . . . n}. 
The node aj is interpreted as the situation where I plays after II has 
chosen price j. The distinguished starting node 1 is a, and the local reward 
vector A: A -P R* is given by i((u,, bi)) = (A(& j), B(i, j)) = A((bi, ai)). The 
resulting DGA game may be recursively solved using the techniques 
of Sections 3-5. We leave the explanation and interpretation of the 
equilibrium cycle c to the economists. 
8. RECAPTURE GAMES AND SURVEILLANCE GAMES 
In this section we define two new classes of games (“recapture” and 
“surveillance”) which can be modeled as DGA games. These games are 
related to the “discrete differential games” introduced by Isaacs [I, 
Chap. 31, including the “hamstrung squad car game” and the “homicidal 
chauffeur game.” All the games considered in this section are two person 
zero-sum. In Isaacs’ games two players, called the pursuer and the evader, 
alternately move their positions along a given graph according to their 
respective “rules of motion.” The payoff to the maximizing evader is the 
number of moves T until their positions coincide (T is called the capture 
time). Isaacs also considered “games of kind” in which the evader wins if 
he avoids capture forever and the pursuer wins on capture. 
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Our two classes of games have the same dynamics as Isaac’s games 
except that play goes on indefinitely, even after capture. The “recapture 
game” has a payoff to the maximizing pursuer of the long term fraction of 
the time that the two players share the same position (node). Equivalently 
the payoff may be taken as the average time taken for the pursuer to 
recapture the evader, with the pursuer as minimizer, since this is the 
reciprocal of the previous payoff. We also define a “surveillance game” 
where the payoff to the maximizing evader is the long term average 
distance between the players. This game is a perfect information analog of 
the game of Cohen, Chung, and Graham [CCG] where the payoff is the 
graph distance between nodes picked simultaneously by two players from 
a given graph. 
We now formally describe the common dynamics needed to define recap- 
ture and surveillance games as DG games. Let N denote the common set 
of nodes to be occupied by the players, and let Ak c Nx N, k = 1,2, . . . . 
denote the arc sets corresponding to the rules of motion for the evader 
k = 1 and the pursuer k = 2. The DG dynamics are then given by the data 
(~,~m,,~-,,A),where~=N~N~{l,2},~~=N~N~{k),and 
The node (i, j, k) describes the situation where the evader occupies node i, 
the pursuer is at node j, and it is player k’s turn to move. 
To make these DG dynamics into DGA games of recapture or 
surveillance we must define appropriate local reward vectors i. Actually it 
will be easier to define local rewards on nodes rather than arcs. The former 
method is a special case of the latter, since we may induce the reward from 
a node onto all arcs leaving that node. Since both games are zero sum we 
need only specify the local reward to the maximizer. For the recapture 
game we define II: R + R by 1(i, j; k) = cij (1 if i = j; otherwise 0). For any 
history h, 17(h) is the fraction of time the players occupy the same node, 
and l/U(h) is the average recapture time (if these limits exist-they do exist 
at equilibrium). To define the payoff for the surveillance game, fix any 
metric p on N, for example the graph distance between nodes for some 
undirected graph. Then define A: iV + R by n(i, j, k) =p(i,j). The payoff 
U(h) is now the long term average distance between the two players. 
To make these games more specific we consider the following dynamics 
which we call the “cyclic dynamics m, M,, M,“: Let C(2m) be the cyclic 
graph consisting of nodes N = { 0, 1, . . . . 2m - 1 } arranged in the usual order 
around a circle, with p the graph distance between nodes. For M, and 
M, arbitrary subsets of (0, 1, . . . . m- I}, define A,= {(i, j)~ N x N: 
p(& j)eMk), k= 1,2, so that the players’ rules of motion are simply 
allowable step-lengths. 
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Now consider the DG cyclic dynamics with m 3 4, M, = (0, 1 }, and 
M, = {2,3). Th is means that the evader can stay still or move one node in 
either direction, while the pursuer must move in steps of length 2 or 3. We 
claim that the recapture game has value 0 because the evader can success- 
fully avoid recapture forever. To describe this evasion strategy we must first 
observe how strategies in cyclic dynamics can be denoted. Since the essence 
of the situation is given simply by the distance p between the players (p is 
a “reduced state variable” in Isaac’s terminology) a strategy for player k is 
a rule p -+ p’ (p’ is distance after player k moves) with p’ = Ip + ~1, some 
E EM,. The successful evasion strategy is now defined by 0 + 1 (E = 1). 
1 + 1 (E = 0), 2 -+ 1 (E = l), and p’ = p + 1 for p > 3. In the surveillance 
game the maximizing hider guarantees an average distance of at least 5/4 
by the strategy p’ = 0 if p < 1 and p’ = p + 1 if p B 2. Similarly the pursuer 
guarantees <5/4 by playing p’=O if p=2, p’= 1 if p= 1, p’=2 if p=O, 
and p’ = p - 3 if p 3 3. The optimal cycle of distance is then 0, 0, 2, 3, 0, 
0, 2, 3, . . . and the value is 5/4. 
Now consider the cyclic dynamics where m > 4, M, = (0, 1) (as before), 
and MZ = { 2, 3,4} (the step-length 4 has been added). The analysis of the 
surveillance game is unchanged, but in the recapture game the pursuer can 
now guarantee capture, so the value is positive. In particular the value is 
l/4, and the mean recapture time is 4. The optimal pursuer strategy (in 
distance notation) is 0 + 3, 1 + 3, 2 -0, 3-+0, and p’=p-4for p>4. An 
optimal evader strategy is to always move away (1 step) from the pursuer. 
The distance sequence following capture is given by 0, 1, 3, 4, 0, 1, 3, 4, . . . . 
for which Z7= l/4. Again we leave the easy proofs, that these strategies are 
optimal, to the reader. 
We conclude this section with two discussions about generalizing recap- 
ture and surveillance games with regard to dynamics (rules of motion) and 
payoffs. Note that our model does not at present allow dynamics that 
depend on history. The “hamstrung squad car game” [I, p. 57; BB] is 
played on a rectangular lattice representing city streets, where the evader 
can move to any of the four adjacent lattice points and the pursuer can 
move either two “ahead” or two “to the right” because he is a policeman 
and must follow traffic laws prohibiting left or U-turns. Capture takes place 
when the players occupy adjacent lattice points. In order for us to have 
dynamics such as “ahead” or “right” we must code the previous as well as 
current node of the pursuer in n. This can be done by defining 
w  = N x N x N x ( 1,2 > where (1, j, /, k) has the additional content that the 
pursuer is current at node j but previously was at node 1. Our second 
generalization involves payoffs. So far in this section we have for simplicity 
considered only two person zero-sum games. We could just as well consider 
a two person game where the evader has the recapture payoff and the 
pursuer has the surveillance payoff, for example. Moreover we can consider 
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three person games where the local payoff vector when 1 is at i, 2 at j, 3 
at r is given by 
4i, j, r) = (P(k r) - p(i, 3, p(j, i) - P(j, r), p(r, j) - p(r, i)). 
Equilibrium strategies for this highly unstable “triangle game” are 
guaranteed by Theorem 2. 
9. CYCLES IN IMPERFECT INFORMATION GAMES 
We conclude this paper with some remarks on allowing cycles in extensive 
form games of imperfect information. Here we use the traditional definition 
of pure and behavioral strategies as deterministic or probabilistic maps 
defined on a player’s information sets. If we consider the infinite tree form of 
the game it is clear that every play of the game will pass through some infor- 
mation set infinitely often. Hence the traditional assumption that an informa- 
tion set may be entered at most once in any play is violated. However, the 
way to deal with such games (at least for finite trees) was shown by Isbell 
[Is]: Players must randomize over a finite number of behavioral strategies, 
and Nash equilibria in such strategies always exist. (The author discovered 
this fact much later [A] in the course of these investigations.) We conjecture 
that imperfect information games with cycles have Nash equilibria in general 
(not finitely supported) distributions over behavioral strategies. To avoid 
possible confusion it should be noted that stationary strategies in DGA 
games correspond to what we are calling pure strategies here. In this context 
the example of Section 2 shows that when cycles are allowed, extensive form 
games with singleton information sets need not have pure strategy Nash 
equilibria. There is room for much further research in this area. 
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